



# CHICAGO POLICE DEPARTMENT TACTICAL REVIEW AND EVALUATION DIVISION 2022 Q1 REPORT



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## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

### **Purpose**

The purpose of the Tactical Review and Evaluation Division (TRED) First Quarter 2022 Report is to provide an overview of TRED's review and analysis of Tactical Response Reports (TRRs) and Firearm Pointing Incidents (FPIs) during the period.

There are references to Consent Decree paragraphs throughout this report. These specific paragraphs are included in the appendix at the end of the report.

*It should be noted that the annual and quarterly reports were previously produced by the Force Review Unit (FRU). Moving forward these reports will be generated by the Tactical Review and Evaluation Division (TRED). The new name change more accurately reflects TRED's focus on new and future responsibilities which include search warrant, foot chase and investigative stop reviews.*

### **SECTION ONE:**

#### **I. Personnel Professional Development**

TRED staff completed 28 hours of FRD-specific in-service training during the first quarter of 2022. This is in addition to the 40-hour yearly required minimum for all Department Members. Topics included, but were not limited to, use of force, Taser, control tactics, room entry, 4th Amendment, vehicle stops and occupant control, and VIRTRA (simulator) training.

TRED continued conducting weekly staff meetings during the First Quarter.

#### **II. Tactical Review and Evaluation Division Resources ¶193 ¶575**

At the end of the First Quarter 2022, TRED operated with the following personnel: 1 Lieutenant, 6 Sergeants and 35 Police Officers. This is a decrease of 1 Police Officer from the previous quarter.

### **SECTION TWO:**

#### **I. Tactical Response Report Reviews and Recommendations ¶157 ¶169**

During the First Quarter, TRED solely relied on data captured by the Clearnet TRR application to track all of the debriefing

points that TRED identified. Using a single data source enables TRED to more efficiently and reliably track and analyze data and information. After launching this application, TRED encountered several technical challenges. These challenges are mostly related to how TRED collects data on the TRR review and approval process, and they are highlighted in Section II. D. and E. (*Reviewing & Approving Supervisor Debriefing Points, Pages 5 & 6*). TRED has requested changes to the TRR application in order to address these challenges and to provide the Department with the detailed information it needed to identify and address trends. These solutions include adding additional debriefing points to the TRR-Review form. In response to TRED's request for changes, the Department made revisions to the TRR application which are in beta form. At the time of publication, TRED is beta-testing these revisions prior to their implementation.

During the First Quarter, TRED published a Tableau dashboard that compiles TRED review data for Department-wide use (*see page 22 for further description of dashboard*). This dashboard has recently been published for internal Department use. TRED conducted training on this dashboard for command staff and lieutenants who are responsible for coordinating and conducting training at the unit level. The goal in publishing the dashboard is to assist the Department in identifying current or developing trends and patterns, allowing for early intervention by supervisors.

During the First Quarter, TRED completed 495 TRR Reviews. Of those reviews, 226 (45.7%) resulted in recommendations and/or advisements to involved members or supervisors. This is a decrease of 14.5 percentage points from the previous quarter (50.7%) where TRED reviewed a total of 536 TRRs. TRED made no referrals to the Civilian Office of Police Accountability.

The number of First Quarter debriefing points for Involved Members, Reviewing Supervisors and Approving/Investigating Supervisors remained fairly consistent with those reported during the previous quarter. The most commonly debriefed issue in the First Quarter for Involved Members was for not specifically articulating all de-escalation/force mitigation efforts used prior to the reportable use of force (93 debriefings). The most commonly debriefed issue in the First Quarter for Involved Mem-



## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY (Continued)

bers was for body-worn camera deficiencies which consisted of a combined 83 debriefings for late activation, no activation, and early termination. Issues related to the proper completion of TRR boxes constituted 52 debriefings.

The most common debriefing point identified for Reviewing Supervisors was “Evidence Technician Not Requested” (21 debriefings). Reviewing supervisors are required to notify an evidence technician (ET) any time a subject is injured, or alleges injury, and whenever a Department Member is injured during a use of force incident.

During the First Quarter, TRED reviewed a total of 87 TRRs that involved a foot pursuit. This resulted in eight foot pursuit-related debriefings (9.1% of reviewed foot pursuits), the most common of which were partner separation issues during the foot pursuit (5 debriefings).

Finally, TRED identified 43 instances during the First quarter in which field supervisors identified and addressed at least one deficiency or training opportunity prior to the TRR being flagged for review by TRED. This calculates to a rate of 8.6% of reviewed TRRs.

### **SECTION THREE:**

#### **I. Force Review Board: Level Three Incidents ¶175 ¶178 ¶185 ¶186 ¶187**

On April 1st, 2021 the Department implemented an addition to the TRR called the Level Three Reportable Use of Force Supplemental Report. This was added to track information specific to Level Three incidents as outlined in the consent decree. For a Level Three incident, the designated exempt-level supervisor completing the TRR-I must now also complete the Level 3 Reportable Use of Force Supplemental Report.

In the First Quarter there were four Level Three use of force incidents resulting in 10 TRRs. These 10 TRRs indicated a use of deadly force by a total of six Department members. All six of these instances involved a firearm discharge at a subject. Medical aid was provided in all four Level Three incidents.

### **SECTION FOUR:**

#### **I. Firearm Pointing Incident Reviews ¶190 ¶192**

During the First Quarter of 2022, there were a total of 860 Firearm Pointing Incidents event numbers (PNT), which resulted in the generation of 738 unique FPI Reports (FPIRs). Of these 738 FPIRs, four of these were identified as duplicate reports. TRED reviewed 734 FPIRs. There were 116 FPIRs that did not have an ISR or Arrest report. Of these 116 FPIRs, TRED referred 10 to the Fourth Amendment Stop Review Unit.

The most common initial event type for a FPI was “Traffic Stop” (183FPIs), followed by “Person with a Gun” (118 FPIs). During the First Quarter, 11.3% of all foot pursuits resulted in a firearm pointing incident.

During the course of 614 Firearm Pointing *Incidents*, Department Members recovered weapons 36.5% of the time. This included the recovery of 199 semi-automatic handguns, 5 revolvers, 8 “other” weapons, 4 knives, 7 rifles, and 1 chemical device.



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## SECTION ONE:

### I. PERSONNEL PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT

The Tactical Review and Evaluation Division (TRED) strives to ensure that all personnel are continually trained on current and relevant department policies. One of the training methods employed is the weekly TRED staff meeting. During these meetings, department policies as well as tactics and training are discussed. TRED develops training topics from changes to Department policy, relevant body-worn camera videos, TRRs, and FPIRs in order to create an open dialogue among unit members. These collaborative sessions are vital to maintaining consistency in TRED reviews. Training attendance sheets and meeting agendas are electronically stored.

TRED members attended **28** hours of in-service training. The training schedule is listed below, and training attendance sheets are electronically stored.

**22 February 2022** 3 Hour Vehicle Stops & Occupant Control *Training & Support Group*

**22 February 2022** 3 Hour VirTra Simulator Training *Training & Support Group*

**23 February 2022** 4 Hour Law Review (4th Amendment, Terry Stops, Stop and Frisk, Warrantless Search and Arrest, Use of Force and Deadly Force) *Training & Support Group*

**23 February 2022** 2 Hour Control Tactics *Training & Support Group*

**08 April 2022** 8 Hour Taser Training *Tactical Training Unit*

**06-07 April 2022** 8 Hour Tactical Room Entry Training *Tactical Training Unit*

The training outlined above is in addition to the 40-hour mandatory in-service training required of all Department members for 2022.

### II. TACTICAL REVIEW AND EVALUATION DIVISION RESOURCES

At the end of the first quarter 2022, the Force Review Division was comprised of **1** Lieutenant, **6** Sergeants, and **35** Review Officers shown in **Table 1**. This is a decrease of **1** Review Officer from the previous quarter.

Lieutenant	<b>1</b>
Sergeants	<b>6</b>
Review Officers	<b>35</b>

Table 1— 1<sup>st</sup> Quarter 2022 Personnel Resources



## SECTION TWO:

### I. TACTICAL RESPONSE REPORT REVIEWS

Per the Consent Decree paragraph 574, “A designated unit at the CPD headquarters level will routinely review and audit documentation and information collected regarding each Level 2 reportable use of force incident, a representative sample of Level 1 reportable use of force, incidents involving accidental firearms discharges and animal destructions with no human injuries.”

In the First Quarter, there were a total of **706** tactical response reports submitted. TRED reviewed **495** (70.1%) of those reports.

The total number of Level 1 uses of force shown in **Figure 1** includes a 5% random sampling of Level 1 uses of force and Level 1 uses of force associated with a foot pursuit or associated with a Level 2 use of force.

TRED reviewed **495** TRRs in Q1 2022; **247** (49.9%) were a Level 1 use of force and **248** (50.1%) were a Level 2 use of force.




Figure 1— Tactical Response Reports by Month 1<sup>st</sup> Quarter 2022.




Figure 2— Tactical Response Report Reviews by Level 1<sup>st</sup> Quarter 2022.



## II. TACTICAL RESPONSE REPORT RECOMMENDATIONS ¶157 ¶169

### A. Recommendations by Member's Role

During the First Quarter, TRED completed 495 Tactical Response Report Reviews. Of those reviews, 45.7%, or 226 resulted in recommendations and/or advisements, to involved members or supervisors.

In many instances, TRED made multiple recommendations and/or advisements concerning a single Tactical Response Report. First quarter TRR recommendations and advisements by member's role are depicted in **Figure 3**.

numbers during the First Quarter.

In 43 instances, or 8.6% of TRRs reviewed, supervisors initiated appropriate corrective actions at the time of incident.

TRED did not make any referrals to the Civilian Office of Police Accountability during the First Quarter.

Unit or district supervisors obtained 31 complaint log




Figure 3— FRD Recommendations by Member's Role of TRRs reviewed from the First Quarter 2022.



## B. Involved Member Debriefing

An “Involved Member” is defined as a member who utilized reportable force during an incident. The most common debriefing point made by TRED for Involved Members during the Fourth Quarter was “Force Mitigation – Not Articulated.” **Figure 4.** This means that the involved member checked at least one force mitigation box for which they did not provide a detailed explanation in the narrative. For example, if a member checks boxes for both “verbal direction” and “tactical positioning,” but only describes verbal direction (and not tactical positioning), then TRED debriefs the member on force mitigation articulation. As part of this debriefing, TRED provides members with guidance on how to better articulate force mitigation efforts on future reports (see Force Mitigation Articulation Guide **Section C**).

The following are some general considerations given to involved members when completing a TRR:

## C. Force Mitigation Articulation

Though force mitigation efforts are not always safe or feasible, they must be employed whenever possible. Examples of questions to consider when documenting force mitigation on the TRR include the following: (1) Verbal Direction/Control Techniques – Did you attempt to warn or persuade the subject before using force? (2) Tactical Positioning – Did you use a Tactical V or L, or did you utilize cover while attempting to speak with the subject? (3) Zone of Safety – Did you attempt to create space between either yourself or others and the subject? (4) Movement to Avoid Attack – Did you backpedal or side-step in an effort to avoid being attacked? (5) Additional Unit Members – Did you request the assistance of a supervisor, CIT or SWAT officers? (6) Other – Did you use time as tactic in order to permit de-escalation of the subject’s emotions in order to give the subject time to comply with commands and give you the time to wait for additional resources?

When describing what you did, be specific. For example, if you checked “Verbal Direction,” describe in as much detail as possible in the narrative what you specifically told the subject. Again, these are just examples. The above listed “force mitigation effort” options may NOT always apply to your unique situation. Do not check any corresponding force mitigation technique boxes that you did not utilize. You must be accurate in your documentation.

These details serve to describe the totality of circumstances, including why force may have been necessary despite your best efforts.




Figure 4— Involved Member Debriefing Points of TRRs reviewed from the First Quarter. See **Appendix A** for a description of each Debriefing Point.



## D. Reviewing Supervisor<sup>1</sup> Debriefing Points

**Figure 5** identifies Debriefing Points made for **Reviewing Supervisors<sup>1</sup>** during the first quarter. CPD policy mandates that the Reviewing Supervisor (Sergeant or above) complete responsibilities outlined in General Order G03-02-02, *Incidents Requiring the Completion of a Tactical Response Report*. TRED reviews reports and Department video in order to determine if Reviewing Supervisors completed the responsibilities required of them following a use of force incident.

One of the challenges with the rollout of the new TRR review application on January 1, 2021 is that certain validators are not yet working. One such validator would prevent a supervisor from being able to review or approve the TRR of another supervisor of equal rank, and another would create a reminder message if the supervisor did not attest to the fact that they did not use or order reportable force. TRED continued to capture this data via the “Other-Policy/Procedure” debriefing point, which is a catch-all for policies and procedures outlined in Department directive G03-02-02.

*\*Note: In preparation for this report, TRED manually sub-categorized the 14 “Other/Policy Procedure” debriefing points. The largest sub-category related to the reviewing supervisor<sup>1</sup> completing a review for a member of the same rank (7 debriefings). Debriefings related to the reviewing supervisor either using or ordering the use of reportable force (2 debriefings) and failing to ensure that involved members*

*carry a Taser (2 debriefings). The remainder were miscellaneous advisements and recommendations for improper documentation and other policy requirements outlined in G03-02-02.*

The most common debriefing point for Reviewing Supervisors in the fourth quarter is “Evidence Technician not requested” (25 debriefings). Reviewing supervisors are required to notify an evidence technician (ET) any time a subject is injured, or alleges injury, and whenever a Department Member is injured during a use of force incident. The FRD most commonly debriefs this issue because the supervisor failed to notify an ET to photograph an injured Department Member or a subject that reportedly did not have a visible injury.

Based on continuing trends using the new TRR review application, the FRD is recommending the addition of specific debriefing points which are sub-categorized within the “Other / Policy Procedure” debriefing point to the new TRR review application. This addition will improve the data collection and analysis process, allowing the FRD and the Department to more efficiently understand trends related to Reviewing Supervisors.




Figure 5— Reviewing Supervisor Debriefing Points of TRRs reviewed from the First Quarter.

<sup>1</sup> Language in the consent decree refers to “Responding Supervisor” whereas CPD policy and forms including the TRR name this role as “Reviewing Supervisor”. The data included on these pages is for the “Responding Supervisor” as defined in the agreement with the IMT.



## E. Approving Supervisor<sup>2</sup> Debriefing Points

**Figure 6** identifies the Debriefing Points made for **Approving Supervisors<sup>2</sup>** during the First Quarter. CPD policy mandates that the Approving Supervisor (Lieutenant or above) complete responsibilities outlined in General Order *G03-02-02, Incidents Requiring the Completion of a Tactical Response Report*. TRED reviews reports and Department video in order to determine if Approving Supervisors completed the responsibilities required of them following a use of force incident.

The most common debriefing point for Approving Supervisors during the First Quarter was “Other Policy/Procedure.” This debriefing point is a catch-all for policies and procedures outlined in Department directives.

As reported in Section D (Page 5), TRED determined that certain validators were not yet working which would help prevent supervisors from reviewing or investigating a supervisor of equal rank. In addition, TRED determined that there may be a need to improve the electronic process that helps ensure a TRR investigation does not go over 48 hours without approval. In the meantime, TRED continued to capture this data via the “Other Policy/Procedure” debriefing point.

*\*Note: In preparation for this report, TRED manually sub-*

*categorized the 39 “Other/Policy/Procedure” debriefing points.* The most common “Other/policy/procedure” sub-categories for the approving supervisor were debriefings for investigations going over 48 hours without documented approval (11 debriefings.) Next were approving a TRR in which the reviewing supervisor (typically a sergeant) was of equal rank to the involved member (6 debriefings) followed by TRR reviews by a supervisor who either used or ordered force (4 debriefings). The remainder were for miscellaneous advisements and recommendations related to policy requirements outlined in G03-02-02.

As reported in Section D (Page 5), TRED is using these trends to make recommendations to add more specific debriefing points to the TRR review application and improve the TRR data collection and analysis process.




Figure 6— Approving Supervisor Debriefing Points of TRRs reviewed from the First Quarter.

<sup>2</sup>Language in the consent decree refers to “Reviewing Supervisor” whereas CPD policy and forms including the TRR name this role as “Approving Supervisor”. The data included on these pages is for the “Reviewing Supervisor” as defined in the agreement with the IMT.



## F. TRRs—Reports and Training Recommendations by Unit

TRRs - Reports and Training Recommendations by Unit 1 <sup>st</sup> Quarter 2022				
Unit	TRRs	TRRs as % of Department Total	TRRs With Advisements and Recommendation	TRRs With Advisements and Recommendations
001	26	5.3%	8	30.8%
002	17	3.4%	6	35.3%
003	5	1.0%	3	60.0%
004	20	4.0%	5	25.0%
005	21	4.2%	13	61.9%
006	43	8.7%	30	69.8%
007	20	4.0%	10	50.0%
008	17	3.4%	8	47.1%
009	14	2.8%	5	35.7%
010	38	7.7%	19	50.0%
011	40	8.1%	25	62.5%
012	16	3.2%	8	50.0%
014	4	0.8%	4	100.0%
015	35	7.1%	19	54.3%
016	12	2.4%	6	50.0%
018	12	2.4%	4	33.3%
019	21	4.2%	6	28.6%
020	9	1.8%	4	44.4%
022	8	1.6%	2	25.0%
024	29	5.9%	17	58.6%
025	17	3.4%	8	47.1%
044	1	0.2%	1	100.0%
050	12	2.4%	4	33.3%
051	3	0.6%	0	0.0%
145	1	0.2%	0	0.0%
189	7	1.4%	5	0.0%
193	9	1.8%	6	0.0%
211	7	1.4%	2	0.0%
212	2	0.4%	2	100.0%
214	1	0.2%	1	100.0%
606	11	2.2%	5	45.5%
610	4	0.8%	2	50.0%
630	2	0.4%	0	0.0%
640	2	0.4%	1	50.0%
715	2	0.4%	1	0.0%
716	7	1.4%	6	85.7%
<b>Total</b>	<b>495</b>		<b>246</b>	

Figure 7— TRRs Reports and Training Recommendations by Unit of TRRs reviewed from the 1<sup>st</sup> Quarter 2022.



## G. TRRs with Foot Pursuits Reviewed

During the First Quarter, TRED reviewed a total of **87** Tactical Response Reports that involved a foot pursuit. These **87** TRRs account for **17.6%** of all TRRs reviewed. Of these **87** reviews, **62%** involved a Level 1 use of force, and **38%** involved a Level 2 use of force **Figure 8**.

Of the **87** TRRs that involve a foot pursuit; **61%** involved no injury to the subject. In **23%** of foot pursuits the subject alleged injury, in **13%** there was a minor injury, and in **3%** injuries were unknown. There were no instances of major injury reported **Figure 9**.

TRED identified **8** debriefing points as they relate to foot pursuits. **Figure 10** shows the specific debriefing points identified regarding foot pursuit issues.

TRED found that the majority of officers involved in a foot pursuit which resulted in a use of force followed the guidelines outlined in the Foot Pursuit policy.

The most common issue identified by TRED involved Partner Separation during the Foot Pursuit (**5** debriefing points). Although there may always be some degree of partner separation due to the nature of a foot pursuit, there were **five** instances in which there was reasonable belief that the separation posed a significant safety risk as described in the Foot Pursuit Policy. In **three** instances, involved members were debriefed in radio communications before, during, or after the conclusion of the foot pursuit.




Figure 8— TRRs with Foot Pursuits by Force Level reviewed in the First Quarter.




Figure 9— TRRs with Foot Pursuits by Subject Injury of reviewed in the First Quarter.




Figure 10— TRRs with Foot Pursuits Reviewed in the First Quarter.



## H. TRRs with Multiple Applications / Energy Cycles of the Taser CEW

During the First Quarter, TRED reviewed a total of **495** Tactical Response Reports. In **19 (2.7%)** of these TRRs, the involved member indicated that a Taser CEW was discharged during a use of force incident **Figure 11**.

TRED reviews all TRRs that involve the indication of a Taser CEW discharge.

Of the **19** TRRs where the involved member indicated that a Taser CEW was discharged, **13 (68.4%)** indicated one energy cycle and **6 (31.6%)** indicated that multiple energy cycles were discharged. **Figure 12**.

The involved member is responsible for justifying each application of the Taser in the narrative of the TRR. The FRD has no accurate method of extrapolating whether the discharge of the Taser made contact with a subject or whether the discharge of the Taser was effective in eliciting a change in behavior in a person.

**¶202** CPD will continue to require officers to, when possible, use only one five-second energy cycle and reassess the situation before any additional cycles are given or cartridges are discharged. In determining whether any additional application is necessary, CPD officers will consider whether the individual has the ability and has been given a reasonable opportunity to comply prior to applying another cycle.

All **19** instances of a Taser CEW discharge were reviewed by an Investigating Supervisor (the rank of Lieutenant or above) to determine if the involved member's actions were in compliance with Department policy. In all instances the Approving Supervisor determined that the involved member's actions were in compliance with Department policy.

In **one** instances TRED made a training recommendation because the involved member dropped the Taser to the ground instead of re-holstering the Taser. This member was re-enrolled in the Taser refresher training course offered by the Training and Support Group. In **one** instance the involved member incorrectly documented the number of energy cycles by counting the trigger pulls twice. In **one** instance the involved member received training for not carrying the Taser on his person. In **one** instance the involved member incorrectly articulated a double trigger pull of the Taser. In this incident, TRED made a recommendation related to the Member's written justification of an inadvertent double deployment of Taser cartridges.




Figure 11— TRRs with Taser CEW Discharge.




Figure 12— TRRs with Taser CEW Discharge / Energy Cycles.



## I. TRRs with Multiple Applications of an OC Device

During the First Quarter, TRED reviewed a total of **495** Tactical Response Reports. In **three** of these TRRs, the involved member indicated that an OC (oleoresin capsicum) Device was discharged during a use of force incident **Figure 13**.

TRED reviews all TRRs that involve the indication of an OC Device discharge.

In **two** OC discharge incidents only one discharge (application) of the OC device was indicated. In **one** incident, the involved member indicated two discharges (applications) of the OC device.

**¶210** *Each individual application of an OC device (e.g., each spray of an officer's personal OC device) by a CPD officer must be objectively reasonable, necessary, and proportional under the totality of the circumstances.*

In **all** of the instances of an OC discharge that were reviewed by an Approving Supervisor (the rank of Lieutenant or above) to determine if the involved member's actions were in compliance with Department policy, the Investigating Supervisor determined that the involved member's actions were in compliance with Department policy.

**¶211** *CPD officers must assist subjects exposed to applications of an OC device with decontamination and flushing when it is safe and feasible to do so. CPD officers must request the appropriate medical aid for a subject after the discharge of an OC device if the subject appears to be in any physical distress, or complains of injury or aggravation of a pre-existing medical condition (e.g., asthma, emphysema, bronchitis, or a heart ailment.)*

In **two** of the instances of an OC discharge, the subject received medical aid from CFD and was taken to the hospital. In **one** instance, medical aid was provided by the involved member and the subject was taken to the hospital.

TRED did not make any training recommendations based on the involved member's OC discharge in these incidents.




Figure 13— TRRs with OC Discharge reviewed in the First Quarter.



## SECTION THREE:

### I. FORCE REVIEW BOARD: LEVEL 3 INCIDENTS ¶175 ¶178 ¶185 ¶186 ¶187

Level 3 incidents are reviewed by the Force Review Board. A Level 3 use of force is any use of force that constitutes deadly force including: discharging a firearm (except unintentional discharges or discharges solely to destroy/deter and animal), using an impact weapon to intentionally strike a person’s head or neck, chokeholds, carotid artery restraints, and any force that results in admission to a hospital, and any force that causes the death of any person.

In the First Quarter there were **four** Level Three use of force incidents resulting in **10** TRRs being completed by Department members. Of these **10** TRRs, **six** indicated a use of deadly force by a Department member and **four** TRRs indicated no reportable use of deadly force by those **four** members during the incident.

There were **four** incidents involving a firearm discharge by a department member. There were a total of **six** department members who discharged their weapons at a person in these **four** incidents. There were no instances of chokeholds, carotid artery restraints, or intentional baton strikes to the head or neck of a person reported by department members. There were no reported instances of warning shots, discharges at persons who were only a threat to themselves, discharges into a crowd, discharge at or into a moving motor vehicle, or discharges at or into a building. None of the eleven Level Three use of force incidents reported a mental health component.

In **all** of the **Level 3** incidents medical aid was requested/provided for the injured subjects by on scene members.

FORCE REVIEW BOARD INCIDENTS 1 <sup>st</sup> QUARTER 2022											
	TRR	2022-00174	2022-00175	2022-00176	2022-00178	2022-00712	2022-00713	2022-00714	2022-00731	2022-00732	2022-00733
	DATE OF INCIDENT	1/27/22	1/27/22	1/27/22	1/27/22	3/29/22	3/29/22	3/29/22	3/31/22	3/31/22	3/31/22
LVL 3 INCIDENT TYPE	Deadly Force, Firearms Discharge	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
	Deadly Force, Chokehold										
	Deadly Force, Impact Weapon Strike to Head or Neck										
	Deadly Force, Other										
	Hospital Admission										
	Force Caused Death to a Person										
TRR-1 SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION	Chokehold Used										
	Carotid Artery Restraint Used										
	Intentional Baton Strike to Head or Neck										
	Member Discharged Firearm	✓		✓	✓		✓	✓	✓		
	Warning Shot Fired										
	Firearm Discharge at a Person Who Was a Threat Only to Self										
	Firearm Discharge Solely in Defense or Protection of Property										
	Firearm Discharged Into a Crowd										
	Firearm Discharged at or Into a Building										
	Firearm Discharged at or Into a Moving Motor Vehicle										
	Firearm Discharged From a Moving Motor Vehicle										
	Member Was On-Duty	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
	Involved a Mental Health Component	NO									
	Medical Aid Provided	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Subject Fled Scene											

Figure 14— Force Review Board Incidents 1<sup>st</sup> Quarter 2022



## SECTION FOUR:

### I. FIREARM POINTING INCIDENTS ¶190 ¶192

Firearm Pointing Incident Events (PNT) are created when a Beat notifies OEMC that they pointed their firearm at a person. The OEMC dispatcher then creates a PNT event number which is cross-referenced to the original event number of the call the Beat was assigned. The CLEARNET reporting system automatically finds these PNT events and creates a Firearm Pointing Incident Report for each PNT event number. If a dispatcher erroneously creates more than one PNT event for the same Beat during an incident, the CLEARNET system will automatically filter out the duplicate record.

TRED attempts to review all FPIRs within thirty days of occurrence. This allows TRED to analyze and report on *incidents* that occurred during the First Quarter, as opposed to reporting on *reviews* completed in the First Quarter. This presents a picture of the actions of the Department, and not TRED, during the first quarter. TRED was not able to review all FPIRs within thirty days due to staffing issues. .

During the First Quarter of 2022, TRED closed **738** Firearm Pointing Incident Reports (FPIRs). **Four** of these were duplicate events that were not automatically filtered by CLEARNET. Multiple beats may respond to the same incident and point their firearm(s). These **734** FPIRs represent **614** unique events beats responded to.

TRED reviewed all reported FPI incidents. This included FPIRs that did not have an ISR or Arrest associated with the incident. This was implemented in direct response to concerns that were raised by the Independent Monitoring Team in previous reporting periods.

For Firearm Pointing Incidents in which an arrest or ISR was not completed, TRED conducts a review to determine if an ISR may have been required but was not completed. In the fourth quarter there were **10** such instances. These were referred to the Fourth Amendment Stop Review Unit for auditing.

Of the FPIRs that the TRED reviewed in the First Quarter, the most common recommendation was **Late Activation** of the **Body-Worn Camera** by the involved Beat (**196** or **72.8%** of recommendations for training). When recommendations for training are made, the FRD sends an email to the Involved Beat's unit Commander and Executive Officer. A designated supervisor conducts a debriefing and training with the involved

beat. That supervisor then enters debriefing comments into the FPIR, and the Unit Commander or Executive Officer approves the debriefing and closes the FPIR.

It should be noted that some Firearm Pointing Incident Reviews may result in multiple recommendations for the same pointing incident.

During the First Quarter, CPD members recovered a total of **224** weapons associated with a member reporting a Firearm Pointing Incident. This represented **36.5%** of the total Firearm Pointing Incidents. This is a slight increase from the fourth quarter where a weapon was recovered in **36.4%** of incidents.

During the First Quarter, **193 (26.2%)** of all FPIRs involved a pursuit (foot, vehicle, foot & vehicle incidents) across **164 incidents**. Of these pursuit-related *incidents*, **91 (55%)** involved the recovery of a weapon.

A total of **42 (6%)** of all FPIRs involved a use of force during the First Quarter. Of the **31** force-related *incidents*, **48% (15)** resulted in the recovery of a weapon.



## A. Firearm Pointing Incident Totals

In the First Quarter, OEMC generated 860 FPI events, 122 of which Clearnet identified as duplicate events. This resulted in 738 FPIR reports being generated by Clearnet. The TRED further identified an additional 4 of these as duplicate reports. The TRED reviewed 734 FPIRs in the First Quarter

In the First Quarter there were an average of 245 FPIRs per month, with March having the highest number (273) of incidents.

**Figure 15.**




Figure 15— Firearm Pointing incidents by Month 1<sup>st</sup> Quarter 2022

## B. FPIRs With Body-Worn Camera Video

In the First Quarter, 94.7% of FPIRs had reviewable body-worn camera video [Figure 16](#).

These numbers only reflect FPIRs that were reviewed by TRED.

TRED recommendations regarding body-worn camera use is addressed on page 18,

**Figure 26.**




Figure 16— FPIRs with body-worn camera video by % 1<sup>st</sup> Quarter 2022



### C. Pointing Incidents by Initial Event Type

When a beat is assigned or responds to an incident, it receives an initial event type as a label from OEMC. Traffic stops account for the largest percentage of all FPIRs (25%) **Figure 17**. OEMC recorded **146,481** traffic stops citywide during the First Quarter. Approximately **0.1%** of these traffic stops resulted in a FPIR **Figure 17**.

There were **159** incidents with an initial event type of “foot pursuit” citywide. Of these foot pursuit events, **11.3%** resulted in a FPIR **Figure 17**.

Incidents with an initial event type of “foot pursuit” account for only **2.5%** of all FPIRs whereas “traffic stops” account for **25%**

**Figure 18**.




Figure 17— OEMC Incidents/Pointing Incidents by Event Type 1st Quarter 2022




Figure 18— OEMC Incidents/Pointing Incidents by Initial Event Type (Top 25) 1st Quarter 2022



## D. Weapons Recovered by Event Type in Association with FPIRs

Weapon recoveries are based upon the number of actual incidents involving a firearm-pointing. Multiple beats may respond to the same incident and report a firearm-pointing. For example, if three separate beats respond to a “person with a gun” call and point their firearms, it results in three FPIRs. If a weapon is recovered in this incident all three FPIRs would indicate a weapon being recovered. The three FPIRs in this example are analyzed as one incident so that it does not appear as though three separate weapons were recovered.

Of the 734 FPIRs, there were 120 incidents in which multiple pointings were reported. Of the 614 total incidents, weapons were recovered in 224, or 36.5% of the time **Figure 19**. Of these recovered weapons, 199 or 88.8% were semi-automatic handguns

The most common event type which led to both a firearm-pointing and the recovery of a weapon was “Traffic Stop” **Figure 20**.




Figure 19— Weapons Recovered by Event Type in Association with FPIR 1st Quarter 2022




Figure 20— Weapons Recovered in Association with Pointing Incidents 1st Quarter 2022



### E. FPIRs With Pursuits

Of the 734 beats that reported pointing their firearm at a person in the First Quarter, 193 (26.2%) were identified by TRED as having a foot or vehicle pursuit by the reporting beat.

The majority of these incidents (182) involved a foot pursuit Figure 21.




Figure 21— FPIRs with pursuits 1<sup>st</sup> Quarter 2022

### F. FPIRs With Pursuits and Weapon Recoveries

There were 614 incidents that Department members responded to which involved an officer pointing their firearm at a person. Of these incidents, 164 involved a pursuit. Officer(s) recovered weapons in 91 or 55% of the pursuit-related incidents Figure 22.




Figure 22— FPIRs with pursuits and Weapon Recovery 1<sup>st</sup> Quarter 2022



### G. FPIRs With Associated TRRs

During the First Quarter, a small percentage of firearm-pointing incidents resulted in a reportable use of force.

Of the **734 beats** that reported pointing their firearm at a person in the First Quarter, TRED identified **42 (6%)** as being associated with a Tactical Response Report (reportable use of force) **Figure 23**.

Of the **734 incidents** that involved a Department member pointing a firearm at a person in the First Quarter, TRED identified **42 (6%)** of those incidents as being associated with a Tactical Response Report. These **42 incidents** resulted in the recovery of a weapon 48% of the time with a total of 15 weapons recovered **Figure 24**.




Figure 23— FPIRs with associated TRRs 1<sup>st</sup> Quarter 2022




Figure 24— FPIRs with associated TRRs and Weapon Recovery 1<sup>st</sup> Quarter 2022



## H. FPIR Review and Recommendation Totals

Of the 738 FPIRs generated and completed by TRED, four were duplicate FPIRs. TRED reviewed 734 FPIRs.

Of these 734 reviewed FPIRs, 240 FPIRs resulted in a recommendation for training with a total of 269 training recommendations. This means that during the First Quarter, 32.7% of FPIRs resulted in at least one training recommendation **Figure 25**.

Body-worn camera usage recommendations account for 236 or 87.7% of all the recommendations that were made during the First Quarter.

Late Activation of the body-worn camera alone accounts for 196 (72.8%) of all recommendations.

Of the 182 FPIs that involved a foot pursuit, the TRED made recommendations related to partner separation in 21 (11.5%) of incidents. **Figure 26**.

TRED did not refer any incidents to the District/Unit of occurrence for corrective and/or disciplinary action related to possible policy violations.

TRED identified 10 incidents that were referred to the Fourth Amendment Stop Review Unit because no ISR was completed.




Figure 25— FPIR Review Totals 1st Quarter 2022




Figure 26— FPIR Recommendation Totals 1st Quarter 2022



## I. Firearm Pointing Incidents and Recommendations by Unit

Firearm Pointing Incidents and Recommendations by Unit 1st Quarter 2022					
Unit	FPIRs	FPIRs as % of Department Total	FPIRs With Recommendations	Recommendations as % of Unit's FPIRs	
001	38	5.18%	12	31.6%	
002	36	4.90%	11	30.6%	
003	42	5.72%	7	16.7%	
004	38	5.18%	11	28.9%	
005	59	8.04%	18	30.5%	
006	53	7.22%	15	28.3%	
007	33	4.50%	5	15.2%	
008	35	4.77%	7	20.0%	
009	23	3.13%	7	30.4%	
010	44	5.99%	15	34.1%	
011	36	4.90%	12	33.3%	
012	16	2.18%	3	18.8%	
014	17	2.32%	9	52.9%	
015	42	5.72%	12	28.6%	
016	5	0.68%	0	0.0%	
017	3	0.41%	2	66.7%	
018	31	4.22%	7	22.6%	
019	11	1.50%	2	18.2%	
020	2	0.27%	0	0.0%	
022	19	2.59%	7	36.8%	
024	16	2.18%	3	18.8%	
025	34	4.63%	3	8.8%	
079	1	0.14%	0	0.0%	
189	2	0.27%	1	50.0%	
193	17	2.32%	5	29.4%	
196	1	0.14%	0	0.0%	
211	15	2.00%	6	40.0%	
212	2	0.27%	2	100.0%	
214	6	0.82%	4	66.7%	
341	1	0.14%	0	0.0%	
606	6	0.82%	1	16.7%	
610	10	1.36%	3	30.0%	
620	3	0.41%	2	66.7%	
630	4	0.54%	1	25.0%	
640	6	0.82%	3	50.0%	
650	5	0.68%	4	80.0%	
712	1	0.14%	0	0.0%	
716	18	2.45%	9	50.0%	
721	3	0.41%	3	100.0%	

Figure 27— Firearm Pointing Incidents and Recommendations by Unit 1st Quarter 2022



## J. FPIR Investigatory Stop Reports and Arrests

There were a total of 734 firearm-pointing incidents created for review in the First Quarter. In 45% of the incidents there was an associated arrest. Incidents that included both an arrest in conjunction with an investigatory stop report accounted for 21.4% of FPIRs. Only 17.8% of incidents had an investigatory stop report with no associated arrest. In 15.8% of the incidents neither an arrest or investigatory stop report was completed **Figure 28**.

Of the 116 incidents that did not have an associated ISR or Arrest Report, 20% had an initial event type of traffic stop, 10% were a person with a gun, and 8% were a shots fired (on view) **Figure 29**.

In most of these cases the required documentation was another appropriate Department form such as a Traffic Stop Statistical Study Card (blue card) or the General Offense Case Report.




Figure 28— Arrest and Investigatory Stop Reports Associated with Pointing Incidents 1st Quarter 2022




Figure 29— FPIRs With No Associated ISR or Arrest Report By Initial Event Type 1st Quarter 2022



## K. FPIR Review and Recommendation Totals

When FPIRs are submitted with recommendations, the involved beat's unit of assignment is notified of the training recommendation. The beat's unit of assignment then assigns a supervisor to debrief the involved beat on the training recommendation.

During the First Quarter, TRED made training recommendations in **240** FPIRs.

Of the FPIRs with recommendations for First Quarter incidents, **189** have been debriefed and closed out by the unit of assignment. A total of **51** are still pending the completion of recommended training, debriefing, or the approval thereof by the involved beat's unit of assignment **Figure 30**.




Figure 30— FPIRs With Completed Recommendations 1<sup>st</sup> Quarter 2022

## L. FPIR Training Actions Completed by Unit

When FPIRs are submitted with recommendations, the involved beat's unit of assignment is notified of the training recommendation. The beat's unit of assignment then assigns a supervisor to debrief the involved beat on the training recommendation. Although TRED makes training recommendations, Unit supervisors have discretion in the training that is conducted.

The best practice is for a supervisor to recognize a training opportunity and take corrective action at the time an incident occurs. A revision to the FPIR allows supervisors to indicate that this happened by marking a selection on the FPIR debriefing titled "Individualized Training Occurred at Time of Incident." In **four** instances supervisors recognized a training opportunity, addressed the issue in a timely manner, and documented the action taken **Figure 31**.




Figure 31— Training Actions Completed By Unit 1<sup>st</sup> Quarter 2022



## **I. PATTERN AND TRENDS ¶157, ¶190, ¶192, ¶220, ¶237, ¶238. ¶239,**

### **A. Tableau Dashboard**

During the First Quarter, TRED published a supervisory debriefing dashboard. This dashboard uses visualization software to pull data from TRED reviews in order to provide a real-time overview of those reviews within each district or specialized unit. The central goal of this dashboard is to provide a tool for supervisors and TRED to better understand patterns and trends within each unit and to allow supervisors and command staff to better understand how those patterns and trends within their own unit compare to other units throughout the city. For example, these dashboards allow a commander or watch operations lieutenant to see what percentage of TRR reviews in their district result in a debriefing point on foot pursuits, body-worn camera compliance or failure to notify an evidence technician. Moreover, supervisors are able to compare these percentages with those of other units across the city. TRED believes this dashboard will be paramount to the Department's efforts to identify patterns and trends for the purpose of appropriately addressing them. This is central to the Department's mission of Unit-level accountability. In the first quarter, TRED conducted training on this dashboard for command staff and lieutenants who are responsible for coordinating and conducting training at the unit level.

### **B. Corrections**

TRED has no corrections to previously published reports at this time.



## APPENDIX A:

### A. Acronyms and Terms

The following is a listing of acronyms and terms utilized by the Force Review Division.

<b>Advisements</b>	FRD training advisements are informal training insights provided to the involved member or involved supervisor from observations made in the course of a TRR review.
<b>AXON</b>	Company that provides the Body Worn Camera system worn by CPD officers.
<b>BATIP</b>	Battery in progress call
<b>BURGIP</b>	Burglary in progress call
<b>BWC</b>	Body-Worn Camera
<b>BWC Early Termination</b>	Indicates that the Involved Member deactivated his BWC before the conclusion of an incident.
<b>BWC Late Activation</b>	Indicates that the Involved Member did not activate his BWC at the beginning of an incident.
<b>BWC No Activation</b>	Indicates that the Involved Member did not activate his BWC at any point during an incident.
<b>BWC Other Issues</b>	Indicates that FRD reviewers identified a miscellaneous issue relating to BWC usage.
<b>CHECKWB</b>	Check the well-being call
<b>CL Numbers Obtained by Units</b>	Complaint Log Numbers obtained by the Reviewing or Approving Supervisor prior to any review by the FRD.
<b>Control Tactics Not Articulated</b>	The Involved Member indicated that they used control tactics by checking the action on their TRR but did not articulate how or when they were used.
<b>CRIMTI</b>	Criminal trespass in-progress call
<b>DD</b>	Domestic disturbance call
<b>ET</b>	Evidence Technician
<b>Foot Pursuit Issue</b>	Indicates that FRD reviewers identified a miscellaneous issue relating to a foot pursuit.
<b>Foot Pursuit – Radio Communications</b>	Indicates that FRD reviewers identified that the Involved Member did not follow the guidelines laid out in Training Bulletin 18-01 as
<b>Force Mit – Communication</b>	Indicates that FRD reviewers observed an issue with either the reporting or application of communication as a Force Mitigation tactic.
<b>Force Mit. – Not Articulated</b>	The Involved Member indicated that they used the principals of Force Mitigation by checking it on the TRR but failed to articulate the actions in their narrative portion of their TRR.



<b>Force Mit. – Positioning</b>	Indicates that FRD reviewers observed an issue with either the reporting or application of positioning as a Force Mitigation tactic.
<b>Force Mit. – Time</b>	Indicates that FRD reviewers observed an issue with either the reporting or application of time as a Force Mitigation tactic.
<b>Force Options</b>	Indicates that the Involved Member incorrectly identified subject’s actions or member’s response in relation to the CPD Force Options Model
<b>FP</b>	Foot Pursuit.
<b>FPIR</b>	Firearm Pointing Incident Report.
<b>ISR</b>	Investigatory Stop Report
<b>MISION</b>	Mission (seat belt, narcotics, etc...)
<b>Narrative Deficiency</b>	Refers to various issues identified by Force Review Division reviewers regarding an Involved Member’s narrative or that of a Reviewing or Approving Supervisor. Typically this involves the member failing to adequately articulate, in writing, portion(s) of the incident.
<b>OEMC</b>	Office of Emergency Management & Communications
<b>Other – Policy Procedure</b>	Indicates that FRD reviewers identified a miscellaneous policy or procedure issue.
<b>Other – Tactics</b>	Indicates that FRD reviewers identified miscellaneous tactical issues.
<b>Performance Recognition System</b>	The Performance Recognition System is an assessment tool for assisting Department supervisors in recognizing exceptional or adverse behavior related to the job performance of members under their command.
<b>PERGUN</b>	Person with a gun call
<b>PERKNI</b>	Person with a knife call
<b>PERSTB</b>	Person stabbed call
<b>Pursuit Box Not Checked</b>	Foot or vehicle pursuit box on the Tactical Response Report was either omitted or incorrectly checked.
<b>PNT</b>	Pointing notification
<b>Radio Communications</b>	Indicates FRD reviewers identified an issue relating to the involved member’s use of radio to communicate with dispatchers or other officers.
<b>Recommendations</b>	Force Review Division training recommendations are provided to the involved member or an involved supervisor and require follow-up debriefing or training conducted by a unit supervisor or the Training and Support Group. A designated unit or Training and Support Group supervisor must then document this training directly in the TRR application.
<b>ROBJO</b>	Robbery just occurred call
<b>SUSPER</b>	Suspicious person call



<b>Search Issue</b>	Indicates an issue was identified by FRD reviewers relating to the Involved Member's search of a subject.
<b>SHOTSF</b>	Shots fired call
<b>SS</b>	Street Stop
<b>SS</b>	Street Stop
<b>Taser – Accidental Discharge</b>	The Involved Member reported accidentally discharging a Taser device.
<b>Taser – Crossfire</b>	Indicates that FRD reviewers identified a crossfire situation involving a Taser.
<b>Taser – Other</b>	Indicates FRD reviewers identified an issue regarding Taser handling, use or reporting.
<b>Taser – Over 5 Seconds</b>	Involved Member utilized a Taser cycle that exceeded 5 seconds.
<b>TRR</b>	Tactical Response Report
<b>TRR-I</b>	Tactical Response Report Investigation
<b>TRR Box Issue</b>	One or more boxes on the Tactical Response Report were either omitted or incorrectly checked.
<b>TRR Inconsistency – External</b>	Indicates that FRD reviewers identified an inconsistency between the TRR or TRR-I and other reports (e.g. Arrest Report or Case Incident Report).
<b>TRR Inconsistency – Internal</b>	Indicates that FRD reviewers identified an inconsistency within the TRR or TRR-I.
<b>TS</b>	Traffic Stop
<b>Vehicle Extraction</b>	Indicates FRD reviewers identified an issue regarding the Involved Member's actions while extracting (removing) a subject from a motor vehicle.
<b>VIRTRA</b>	A 300-degree small arms judgmental use of force and decision-making simulator for law enforcement training. This intense, immersive training environment takes into account every detail from the smallest pre-attack indicators to the most cognitive overload stimuli situations imaginable.

## ***B. Consent Decree Paragraphs***

- ¶157 CPD will collect and analyze information on the use of force by CPD members, including whether and to what extent CPD members use de-escalation techniques in connection with use of force incidents. CPD will use this information to assess whether its policies, training, tactics, and practices meet the goals of this Agreement, reflect best practices, and prevent or reduce the need to use force.
- ¶169 For foot pursuits associated with reportable use of force incidents, by January 1, 2020, CPD will review all associated foot pursuits at the headquarters level to identify any tactical, equipment, or training concerns.



- ¶175 Starting January 1, 2021, in use of force incidents involving CPD officers, CPD will require CPD officers to provide life-saving aid consistent with their LEMART training to injured persons as soon as it is safe and feasible to do so until medical professionals arrive on scene. CPD will replenish IFAKs, and the contents thereof, used by CPD officers as necessary to ensure officers have the equipment necessary to render aid consistent with their LEMART training. Subsequent to January 1, 2021, CPD will ensure that any officer regularly engaged in patrol activities who has no prior LEMART training receives LEMART training within one year of beginning his or her regular patrol activities
- ¶178 CPD officers are prohibited from using carotid artery restraints or chokeholds (or other maneuvers for applying direct pressure on a windpipe or airway, i.e., the front of the neck, with the intention of reducing the intake of air) unless deadly force is authorized. CPD officers must not use chokeholds or other maneuvers for intentionally putting pressure on a person's airway or carotid artery restraints as take-down techniques.
- ¶185 CPD will continue to prohibit officers from firing warning shots.
- ¶186 CPD officers must not fire at moving vehicles when the vehicle is the only force used against the officer or another person, except in extreme circumstances when it is a last resort to preserve human life or prevent great bodily harm to a person, such as when a vehicle is intentionally being used to attack a person or group of people. CPD will continue to instruct officers to avoid positioning themselves or remaining in the path of a moving vehicle, and will provide officers with adequate training to ensure compliance with this instruction.
- ¶187 CPD will prohibit officers from firing from a moving vehicle unless such force is necessary to protect against an imminent threat to life or to prevent great bodily harm to the officer or another person
- ¶190 Beginning July 1, 2019, CPD officers will, at a minimum, promptly after the incident is concluded, notify OEMC of investigatory stop or arrest occurrences in which a CPD officer points a firearm at a person in the course of effecting the seizure. The notification will identify which CPD beat(s) pointed a firearm at a person in the course of effecting the seizure. The City will ensure that OEMC data recording each such notification is electronically linked with CPD reports and body-worn camera recordings associated with the incident, and all are retained and readily accessible to the supervisor of each CPD beat(s) identified in the notification.
- ¶192 A designated unit at the CPD headquarters level will routinely review and audit documentation and information collected from all investigatory stop and arrest occurrences in which a CPD officer pointed a firearm at a person in the course of effecting a seizure. The review and audit will be completed within 30 days of each such occurrence. This review and audit will:
- identify whether the pointing of the firearm at a person allegedly violated CPD policy;
  - identify any patterns in such occurrences and, to the extent necessary, ensure that any concerns are addressed; and
  - identify any tactical, equipment, training, or policy concerns and, to the extent necessary, ensure that the concerns are addressed.
- The designated unit at the CPD headquarters level will, where applicable, make appropriate referrals for misconduct investigations or other corrective actions for alleged violations of CPD policy. At the completion of each review and audit, the designated unit at the CPD headquarters level will issue a written notification of its findings and, if applicable, any other appropriate actions taken or required to an immediate supervisor as described above.
- ¶193 CPD will ensure that the designated unit at the CPD headquarters level responsible for performing the duties required by this Part has sufficient resources to perform them, including staff with sufficient experience, rank, knowledge, and expertise.
- ¶220 In completing the TRR, or whatever similar documentation CPD may implement, CPD members must include a narrative that describes with specificity the use of force incident, the subject's actions, or other circumstances necessitating the level of force used; and the involved member's response, including de-escalation efforts attempted and the specific



types and amounts of force used. The narrative requirement does not apply to CPD members who discharged a fire arm in the performance of duty or participated in an officer-involved death in the performance of duty. Any CPD member who observes or is present when another CPD member discharges a firearm or uses other deadly force must complete a written witness statement prior to the end of his or her tour of duty. CPD members will note in their TRRs the existence of any body-worn camera or in-car camera audio or video footage, and whether any such footage was viewed in advance of completing the TRR or any other incident reports. CPD members must complete TRRs, or what ever similar documentation CPD may implement, and other reports related to the incident, truthfully and thoroughly.

- ¶237** CPD will continue to require all officers assigned to patrol field duties to wear body-worn cameras and microphones with which to record law-enforcement related activities as outlined in the Illinois Law Enforcement Officer-Worn Body Camera Act (50 ILCS 706/10-1 et seq.), with limited exceptions, including, but not limited to, when requested by a victim or witness of a crime, or interacting with a confidential informant. CPD will develop and implement a written policy delineating the circumstances when officers will not be equipped with body-worn cameras.
- ¶238** CPD will continue to maintain a policy regarding body-worn camera video and audio recording that will require officers to record their law-enforcement related activities, and that will ensure the recordings are retained in compliance with the Department's Forms Retention Schedule (CPD-11.717) and the Illinois Law Enforcement Officer-Worn Body Camera Act. At a minimum, CPD's body-worn camera policy will:
- a. clearly state which officers are required to use body-worn cameras and under which circumstances;
  - b. require officers, subject to limited exceptions specified in writing, to activate their cameras when responding to calls for service and during all law enforcement-related activities that occur while on duty, and to continue recording until the conclusion of the incident(s);
  - c. require officers to articulate in writing or on camera their reason(s) for failing to record an activity that CPD policy otherwise requires to be recorded;
  - d. require officers to inform subjects that they are being recorded unless doing so would be unsafe, impractical, or impossible;
  - e. address relevant privacy considerations, including restrictions on recording inside a home, and the need to protect witnesses, victims, and children;
  - f. establish a download and retention protocol;
  - g. require periodic random review of officers' videos for compliance with CPD policy and training purposes;
  - h. require that the reviewing supervisor review videos of incidents involving reportable uses of force by a subordinate; and
  - i. specify that officers who knowingly fail to comply with the policy may be subject to progressive discipline, training, or other remedial action.
- ¶239** CPD officers must comply with the body-worn camera policy. CPD will impose progressive discipline, training, or other remedial action on officers who do not comply with the body-worn camera policy, as permitted by applicable law.
- ¶575** CPD recently established a Force Review Unit ("FRU") and tasked the FRU with certain responsibilities described in the preceding paragraph. CPD will ensure that the FRU or any other unit tasked with these responsibilities has sufficient resources to perform them. CPD will ensure that the FRU or any other unit tasked with these responsibilities is staffed with CPD members, whether sworn or civilian, with sufficient experience, rank, knowledge, and expertise to: effectively analyze and assess CPD's use of force practices and related reporting and review procedures; conduct trend analysis based on use of force data; identify tactical, equipment, training, or policy concerns based on analysis of use of force incidents and data; and develop recommendations regarding modifications to tactics, equipment, training, or policy as necessary to address identified practices or trends relating to the use of force.